The problem of detecting a nuclear weapon smuggled in an ocean-going cargo container has not been solved, and the detonation of such a device in a large city could produce casualties and property damage exceeding those of September 11, 2001 by orders of magnitude. Any means of detecting such threats must be fast and cheap enough to screen the millions of containers shipped each year, and must be capable of distinguishing a threatening quantity of fissionable material from the complex loading of masses of innocent material found in many containers. Here we show that radiography with energetic X-rays produced by a 10 MeV electron accelerator, taking advantage of the high density and specific atomic properties of fissionable material, may be a practical solution.
Introduction
Approximately 7,000,000 cargo containers enter the United States by sea each year, and about 9,000,000 by land 1 . Roughly comparable numbers are shipped between other countries. These containers, only a comparatively few of which are opened for inspection 2 , offer a terrorist a potential means of smuggling a nuclear weapon across international borders. Twice in recent years fifteen pound (7 kg) chunks of depleted uranium, harmless itself but massive enough to resemble threatening quantities of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, are known to have passed border inspection without detection 3, 4 . In this paper we present the results of Monte Carlo calculations showing that radiographs taken with sufficiently energetic X-rays are capable of detecting threatening quantities of fissionable material, even in a container loaded with other massive absorbers in a complex geometry.
X-ray radiography is the traditional method of looking inside opaque objects 5 . It works very well for comparatively small objects, but the dimensions (2.6 m × 2.6 m × 12 m) and heavy and spatially complex loading of the standard 40-foot cargo container present serious obstacles. At a mean density of 0.3 g cm −3 (this 24 MT [metric ton] load is typical, although loads up to 30 MT are permitted) its column density across its shortest dimension is 78 gm cm −2 . The scattering of X-rays of energies less than a few hundred KeV is well described by the Thomson cross-section 6 , giving an opacity of about 0.2 cm 2 /g for most materials. This leads to 15.6 e-folds (a factor of 1.7 × 10 −7 ) of beam attenuation, which precludes use of these lower energy X-rays.
Fortunately, at higher energies the scattering cross-section is described by the KleinNishina formula 6 , and declines nearly as the reciprocal of the energy. For high-Z materials such as uranium and plutonium another absorption process, electron-positron pair production, whose cross-section increases with energy, dominates the attenuation above about 3 MeV 6,7 . Pair production is less important for lower-Z materials, so their opacities flatten out or continue to decrease as the energy increases, as shown in Figure 1 .
The beam attenuation across a container filled with 0.3 g cm −3 of low or medium-Z material is then only about 2 e-folds (a factor of 0.14) at energies of several MeV, so that X-ray radiography becomes possible. Further, because the opacity (in cm 2 /g) is larger for high-Z materials, they will stand out even more strongly in radiographs than indicated by their high density alone.
Calculations
The multiple physical processes and complex geometries required to model X-ray radiography imply that quantitative results can only be obtained from Monte Carlo calculations.
It is necessary to include electron and positron elastic scattering, bremsstrahlung, collisional ionization and Coulomb pair production, pair annihilation, photon Compton and coherent scattering, photoionization and photopair production and radiative recombination. The spatial, angular and energy distribution of photons, electrons and positrons must be tracked. In auxiliary calculations photoneutron processes and neutron transport and capture must be calculated as well. In order to handle these computationally formidable tasks we used the MCNPX code 8−10 .
We first consider a 5 kg sphere of δ-plutonium (r = 4.22 cm) at the center of a container otherwise uniformly filled with iron to a density of 0.3 g cm 
Results
The discriminating power of high energy X-ray radiography is demonstrated by Figure   3 , in which the plutonium sphere is clearly and unambiguously revealed. The statistical uncertainty in the results may be estimated from the point-to-point fluctuations in the signal, and is < 10%. The entire length of a 40-foot (12 m) cargo container may be scanned with 1200 exposures as it is continuously moved through a pulsed X-ray beam.
MeV electron accelerators may produce micro-second pulses at a rate of several hundred 
Discussion
If the direction of irradiation were vertical the plutonium sphere would not be detectable because the line of sight through it would pass through the centers of two of the iron spheres, for a total of 314 g cm −2 of iron. It is for this reason that oblique illumination was chosen. Multiple oblique angles may be used to reduce further the possibility of concealing a fissionable threat object behind opaque masses of lower-Z material. The plutonium is detectable, even though lines of sight through it also pass through one of the iron spheres, because its characteristic signature-a combination of high attentuation and small dimension transverse to the beam-is found only for massive chunks of high-Z material and for paths along the long axes of long slender objects.
In innocent cargo long slender dense objects are packed with their longest axes horizontal, and dense cargoes are spread on the floor of the container. Therefore, near-vertical irradiation will only rarely show regions of intense absorption in innocent cargo. In contrast, horizontal irradiation would often find this "false positive" result, requiring manual unloading and inspection. Another advantage of downward near-vertical illumination is that the Earth is an effective beam-stop; combined with a thin lead ground plane, its albedo is negligible and additional shielding would not be required.
A terrorist could hide his fissionable cargo in the shadow of a very large and deep absorber (such as a 30 MT cube of solid iron). Such a threat could be found by opening the very few containers which show absorption too deep to see through. The innocent shipper can avoid a false-positive detection (and the opening of his container) by ensuring that his cargo not present a deep, spatially localized, absorption maximum in the known direction of irradiation. It is not necessary that radiography find all threats or exculpate all unthreatening containers, only that it identify all containers that might contain a threat, and make that number small enough to permit opening and manual inspection.
There is a premium on using as high energy X-rays (and necessarily high energy electrons) as possible. Not only is the overall transmission increased, but the discrimination between high-Z and low or medium-Z opacities improves. In addition, the coherent and
Compton scattering cross-sections are less and the bremsstrahlung radiation pattern and the Compton scattering cross-section are more forward-peaked 6 . Scattered radiation tends to fill in the deep and spatially localized absorption minima of chunks of high-Z material, which are their characteristic signature. This may be minimized by increasing the electron (and therefore X-ray) energy, and by use of a Bucky collimator which absorbs scattered radiation arriving on oblique paths.
The chief objection to the use of more energetic X-rays (and electron accelerators) is photoneutron production. For most nuclei the photoneutron energy threshold is about 8 MeV 7 , so electron beams of energy greater than 8 MeV will produce some X-rays energetic enough to make neutrons and lead to a low level of neutron activation in innocent cargo.
However, at the required intensity of irradiation this is insignificant. Depositing 10 MeV of X-ray energy (typically about three X-rays) in a 1 cm × 1 cm detector on a path through the center of a 5 kg plutonium sphere in a very cluttered container (Figure 4) will show the depth of absorption to a factor of about two, sufficient for the image to show the dense high-Z object. From the calculated results, this would require 1.1 × 10
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10 MeV electrons per image slice, or about 0.18 Joule (small compared to the capability of industrial radiographic accelerators). The container would be irradiated with about 1.3 × 10 −7 J/cm 2 of X-rays on its upper surface, or a total of about 40 mJ of energetic X-rays. Even at photon energies of 10-20 MeV the photoneutron cross-section is no more than 0.01 of the total cross-section 7 , so that these 2.5 × 10 10 X-rays produce, at most, 2.5 × 10 8 photoneutrons. This should be compared to the cosmic ray neutron production of 0.1/kg/sec 13 , or 3 × 10 3 /sec for a 30 MT cargo. Even the highest energy radiography produces a neutron fluence and activation less than that produced by a day of cosmic ray exposure.
The neutron production in the collimators, which absorb nearly all the X-rays, is also small. The 1200 pulses required to scan a 40 foot (12 m) container in 1 cm slices contain 1.3 × 10 14 electrons. We have calculated, again using MCNPX 8−10 , the photoneutron production in the 7 mm tungsten converter followed by a 10 cm lead collimator. The neutron to electron ratio is 7 × 10 −6 at 10 MeV, 7 × 10 −4 at 15 MeV and 2.5 × 10 −3 at 20
MeV (where the bremsstrahlung spectrum overlaps the nuclear giant dipole resonance 14 ).
For 10 MeV electrons the dose to an unshielded operator at 20 m range who examines one container per minute would be 500 nanoSv/hr (using the standard relation of flux to dose rate 15 ). This is a factor of 50 times less than the occupational limit of 0.05 Sv/year (25 microSv/hr), and only a small fraction of the typical 2 mSv/year natural background.
The advantages of radiography at energies of 10 MeV may be obtained with acceptable personnel exposure. 
